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[So F. No. 20379. In Bank. Feb. 16, 1961.] 
CLARENCE O. GREENE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT Ol~ THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, Respondellt; RENEE S. GREENE, Real 
Party in Interest. 
[1] Motions-Orders-Vacation.-After a change of venue a court 
of coordinate jurisdiction has power to vacate the orders of the 
court of original vcnue, but that power is no greater than that 
which the original court possessed. 
[21 Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification in Separate Ac-
tion.-Even if an order reducing alimony payments pendente 
lite, in a modificatioll proceeding brought by the husband, was 
erroneous, a motion to vacate such order was an improper 
remedy. 
[3] ld. - Temporary Alimony - Appeal.-An order granting or 
denying temporary alimony is not merely a procedural ruling 
made during the course of the action that the court may re-
consider at any time before final judgment, but is directly 
appealable as a final judgment independently of the main 
action. . 
[4] ld. - Temporary Alimony - Mod.i1ication and Vacation of 
Orders.-An order granting or denying temporary alimony may 
be directly attacked in the trial court under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 473, on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect or that it is void. 
[5] Judgments-Correction-Judicial Error.-'-Although the trial 
court can correct its own inadvertence or clerical error or set 
aside a judgment or order obtained by extrinsic fraud, it can 
correct judicial error only on motion for new trial or on 
motion under Code Civ. Proc., § 663, to vacate the order or 
judgment and enter a different one. 
[6] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification in Separate Ac-
tion.-In a husband's action to reduce alimony payments pro-
vided for in a Nevada divorce decree, even if an order of a 
superior court reducing such payments violated the full faith 
and credit clause of the federal Constitution, it was not void; 
and where another superior court, to which the cause was trans-
ferrell on the wife's motion for change of venue, vacated the 
order, on lIlotion therefor, on the ground that it was "beyonll 
[3] See Cal.Jur.£d, Divorce and Separation, § 190. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Motions, § 24; (2, 6] Divorce, 
§ 216(8); [3] Divorce, § 195(2); [4] Divorce, § 191(4); (5] Judg. 
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the authority of the court," it exceeded its jurisdiction in so 
doing. 
[7] Prohibition-Grounds for Relief-Want of Jurisdiction.-AI-
though prohibition will, not lie to review the validity of 11 
completed judicial act, it is a proper remedy to prevent further 
judicial action based on a void order. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to set aside the vacation of 
an . order reducing monthly alimony payments pendente lite, 
and to restrain the Superior Court of t~ City and County of 
San Francisco from proceeding further in the cause. Per-
emptory writ granted. 
Jack Miller, Kroloft, Brown, Belcher &; Smart and Duncan 
Davidson for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Bert W. Hirschberg for Real Party in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In February 1959 a Nevada court granted 
Mrs. Renee S. Greene a' final decree of divorce from 
Clarence O. Greene, petitioner herein. The decree incorporated 
a'property settlement agreement of the parties, which provides 
among other things for payments to Mrs. Greene of $600 a 
month. In March of 1960 petitioner sought a modification 
of the Nevada decree in the Superior Court of San Joaquin 
County. He alleged that because of changed circumstances 
he was unable to make the $600. monthly payments and moved 
for an order pendente lite reducing the payments to $200 a 
month. By a default minute order of April 28, 1960, the 
motion to reduce the payments pendente lite was granted. On 
June 16, 1960, a motion for change of venue by Mrs. Greene 
was granted and the cause transferred to the Superior Court 
for the City and County of San Francisco. On July 20, 1960, 
Mrs. Greene moved in that court to vacate the order reducing 
the payments pendente lite. The motion was granted on the 
ground that the pendente lite order "was and is beyond the 
authority of the Court." Petitioner sought a writ of prohibi-
tion or other appropriate writ to set aside the vacation of the 
order reducing the monthly payments and to restrain the 
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San Francisco court from proceeding further in the cause. 
We issued an alternative writ of prohibition. 
It is contended that an appeal from all order vacating 
an appealable order is an adequnte rpmedy. (Colby v. Piel'cr, 
15 Cal.App.2d 723,724-725 [59 P.2d 1046].) 'rhe absenl'e of 
another adequate remedy, however, was dpit'J'mined when we 
granted the alternative writ. (Cily & COI/Ilty of San Fran-
cisco v. Superior Cou,.t, 53 Ca1.2d 236, 243 [347 P.2d 294].) 
[1] After a change of venue a court of coordinate juris- I 
diction has the power to vacate the orders of the court of 
original venue. (Ross v. lIIllrplly, 113 Cal.App.2d 453, 455 
[248 P.2d 122].) The power to vacate, however, is no gl'eater 
than that which the original court possessed. 
Mrs. Greene moved to vacate the order reducing payments 
pendente lite 011 the ground that the San Joaquineourt had 
no jurisdiction .to make such an order. She contends, not that 
the court lacked personal or subject.matter jurisdiction, but 
that the Nevada divorce decree was nonmodifiable in Nevada 
and that the San Joaquin court excceded its jurisdiction in 
reducing the payments thereunder in violation of the full 
faith and credit and due process clauses of the United States 
Constitution. 
[2] We do not reach the question whether the reduction 
in payments was erroneous. Even if it was, the motion to 
vacate was an . improper remedy. [3] An order granting 
or denying temporary alimony is not merely a procedural 
ruling made during the course of the action that the court 
may reconsider at any time before final jndgment (see City 
of Los Anyeles v. Oliver, 102 CaI.App. 299, 325-326 [283 P. 
298] ; De la Beckwith v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 496, 499-
500 [80 P. 717] ; Harth v. Ten EycT..~, 16 Ca1.2d 829, 832-833 
[108 P.2d 675]), but is directly appealable as a final judg· 
ment independently of the main action. (Lincoln v. Superior 
Court, 22 Ca1.2d 304, 310 [139 P .2d 13].) [ 4] It also 
may be directly attacked in the trial court under section 473 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds of mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or that it is void. 
[5] Although the trial court can correct its own inadvertence 
or clerieal error (Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Ca1.2d 913, 916 
[156 P.2d 25]), or set aside a judgment or order obtained by 
extrinsic frawl (Mdhti1l'ness v. Supe-rim· Court, 196 Cal. 222, 
230-232 [237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110]), it can correet judicial 
error onl)' 011 a motion for new trial (Cat'ney v. Simmonds, 
49 Ca1.2d 84, 90-91 [315 P.2d 305]) or on a motion under 
) 
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section 663 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate the order 
or judgment and enter a different one. 
[6] Even if the order of the San Joaquin court violated 
the full faith and credit clause, it was not void (Treinies v. 
Sunshine Min. Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 [60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85]), 
and since the San Francisco court did not vacate that order 
pursuant to any of its other powers stated above, it exceeded 
its jurisdiction in so doing. (City of San Diego v. Superi01' 
Court, 36 Ca1.2d 483,486-487 [224 P.2d 685] ; Barlow v. Oity 
Council of the City of Englewood, 32 Ca1.2d 688, 692·693 [197 
P.2d 721] ; Bowman v. Bowman, 29 ·Ca1.2d 808, 814-815 [178 
P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246] ; Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Ca1.2d 
!J13, 916 [156 P.2d 25] ; BastaFa.n v. Brown, 19 Ca1.2d 209, 
214 [120 P.2d 9]; Holtum v. Grief, 144 Cal. 521, 524-525 
[78 P. 11].) [7] Although prohibition will not lie to review 
the validity of a complete judicial act, it is a proper remedy 
to prevent further judicial action based upon a void order. 
(City of San Diego v. Superior Court, 36 Ca1.2d 483, 487-488 
[224 P.2d 685].) 
Let the peremptory writ issue prohibiting respondent court 
from giving effect to its order setting aside the order of the 
Superior Court of San Joaquin County. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
The petition of the real party in interest for a rehearing 
was denied March 15, 1961. 
